# X-Force Exchange


Threat Intelligence Collection and Sharing

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## Agenda

- Threat Analyst Operations 'Getting to Go'
  - Threat evaluation, investigation, and mitigation
- The Power of Community Getting in front of active Campaigns
- Demo Identifying, Analyzing, Mitigating, and Sharing Active Threats
- Q&A



## 'Getting to Go' - Mitigating Active Infiltration


Alert - Business Relevant Investigation Candidates

Research - History, Related IOCs, IPs, URLs, Malware - history & current activity

Mitigation - Business Risk Prioritization

Action Required - Analyst Coordination with IT & Network Operations








#### Analyst Workflow

- Potential Threat Identified
   (SIEM Alert, SPAM ID, Malware Scan)
- 2. Research Information Collection
  - a. IP Reputation
  - b. URL Reputation
  - c. Malware History, Shared Information?
- 3. Validate Edit Report
- 4. Action Report/Remediate/Share



# KEEP

AND

WAIT FOR IT

# infiltrating an enterprise

- A. At hotel, want WiFi access in Lobby
- B. Presented with 'Hotel's' WiFi Finder App and promise of Free WiFi
- C. Select 'Connect' authenticate to O/S to permit installation

#### Powned

D. Urgent phone call - close laptop - leave town



## back home in SOC

SIEM Alert - SRC 172.10.34.17 DEST **216.158.85.49** 

Identified C2 Communications

Response


Identify SRC Machine from Asset Repository/Network


Institute Malware Scan

Found Suspicious File MD5: 560d68c31980c26d2adab7406b61c651




## demonstration







# threat data -> intelligence





"We can't share our threat findings ..."

An International Bank's CISO



#### We've got an IOC, Don't Tell Anyone



### 'Anyone' already knows



If we share it, it might get used against us



#### It's already been used against you



Maybe it's not that bad ...



A public breach doesn't improve with age.



'It' has already happened.



Let's just deal with it.



## what we can share (our experience)

Attack Flow

Suspect Internet IP's & URLs

Identified Malware Signatures

Other IOC's (Registry Keys, dropped files, command files, executables, etc.)


Meaningful Correlations

Significant data to assist the 2nd analyst



## what we (typically) don't share

- internal infrastructure (internal networks, ip's)
- Oday application and system vulnerabilities (unublished)
- target specific data (individuals, accounts, etc)





#### https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com

#### Ideas

'What is the role of Threat Intelligence Sharing?
Won't the Attackers Use it against us?
Why 'Collections?'
How do I know good intel from bad?
What about misdirection?
What about privacy?





The Unthinkable or Unacceptable is not the same as the Impossible.

Plan for it - or it will plan for you.

Anonymous



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