Vista system restore rootkit

Principle and protection

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About speaker

u Network ID : CardMagic u Author of DarkSpy anti-rootkit u Posted several articles on rootkit.com u R&D of some world famous kernel level products in global companies Experienced in Windows kernel mode research and programming u Now is a researcher of Trend Micro threat solution team

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What will be introduced

- Internals of Vista system restore
 A user-mode rootkit to hide arbitrary file or registry key from Windows Vista system restore
- u A new way to bypass modern HIPS u Detection and protection of the threat

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Agenda

u Vista system restore (VSR) introduction
u VSR internals
u VSR rootkit
u A new way to bypass HIPS
u Protect & detect VSR
u Demo

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Vista system restore (VSR) introduction

- VSR allows user to use restore point to return their system files and settings to an earlier point in time
- System restore in Vista has been enhanced a lot and use new architecture & implementation which is different from XP's
- System Restore can make changes to Windows system files, registry settings, and programs installed on your computer. It also can make changes to scripts, batch files, and other types of executable files on your computer

VSR internals

 But how does VSR work? Microsoft hasn't provided detail document about how it works.

We will introduce the whole process in three phases


<u>Create restore point</u> (when you click "Create" button)
 <u>Serve a restore request</u> (when you click "Restore" button)
 <u>Shutdown & Startup</u> (when the system shuts down after you clicking "Restore")

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u Create restore point

Rely on shadow copy mechanism to create a volume shadow copy, see the call stack of SRSetRestorePoint

VSSAPI!CreateVssBackupComponents SPP!CSpp::_CreateGroupHelper+0x2a7 SPP!CSpp::CreateGroupNoEnum+0xde srclient!SetSRStateAfterSetup+0xc58 srclient!SetSRStateAfterSetup+0xd55 srclient!SetSRStateAfterSetup+0xff0 srclient+0x2ae0 srclient!SRSetRestorePointW+0x29 TMVEManager!CVirtualEnvironment::CreateRestorePoint+0x7f TMVEManager!CSystemProtectionDlg::OnBnClickedCreatevirtualenvironment+0xb4 TMVEManager! AfxDispatchCmdMsg+0x43 TMVEManager!CCmdTarget::OnCmdMsg+0x118 TMVEManager!CDialog::OnCmdMsg+0x1b TMVEManager!CWnd:::OnCommand+0x90 TMVEManager!CWnd::OnWndMsg+0x36 TMVEManager!CWnd::WindowProc+0x22 TMVEManager!AfxCallWndProc+0x9a TMVEManager!AfxWndProc+0x34 USER32!GetMessageW+0x6e USER32!GetMessageW+0x146




Shadow copy

Implemented with disk filter -- Volsnap.sys

It can back up original sector when it finds any writer's modification action and provide backup application a point in time view of a volume

E.g. if application(writer) has written a,b,d, the original copy of these sectors are kept by shadow copy service in storage. When backup application accesses the three sectors, shadow copy service will route the request to original copy. However, when c is requested, the service will direct the request to real volume.

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Associated shadow copy files located here:

.ocal Disk (C:) 🕨	Search		
Views 🔻 🗖	Open With		
Name		Date modified	Туре
SPP		8/1/2006 11:50 PM	File Fi
1 (1 (1 (1 (1 (1 (1 (1 (1 (1 (腸 Windows Backup		
🐌 Windows	Васкир	7/10/2006 3:53 AM	
	Backup a-21ef-11db-a422-c8bba98e3530}{3808876b-c176-4e48-b7ae-0		Syste

HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8

HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy9

HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy{5a183e24-21ef-11db-a422-c8bba98e3530} HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy{5a183e36-21ef-11db-a422-c8bba98e3530} HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy{5a183e3a-21ef-11db-a422-c8bba98e3530} Backup file id matches the name of shadow volume device name

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u Serve a restore request

When backup program calls restoration method, two processes will be launched : WmiPrvSE.exe(to hold srwmi.dll), dllhost.exe(to hold srcore.dll)


🖻 🗐 services exe	544	1.49	Services and Controller app
🖻 🧾 svchost exe	736		Host Process for Windows Services
WmiPrv SE.exe	3180		WMI Provider Host
dihost.exe	4092		COM Surrogate
Ellevahad ava	796		Hart Procees for Windows Services

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Then the control transferred to srwmi.dll --CSrWMIProvider::Restore


This method will involve srcore.dll:



; D ; C

srcore.dll will do some preparation and configuration work and then call its internal interface _RegisterForShutdownContinuation.

This routine will create WinInit key and register a callback function for Windows shutdown. And the key looks like



u Shutdown & Startup

The Shutdown Call back:

When system shuts down, the ShutdownContinuation will be called, and this callback routine is exported by srcore.dll. In this routine, it will parse shadow volume information and restore various system elements. The main restore logic include two parts :

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a. Registry restore : The registry restore is based on hive file:

srcore will firstly rename the original hive file and then copy the backed hive file from volume shadow copy. The original hive file will be renamed as xxxx_previous, and after reboot system will use the backed hive file.

11/2/2006 3:34 AM	S
8/2/2006 12:15 AM	F
8/2/2006 1:03 AM	F
Type: LOG2 File	-
Size: 0 bytes	
Date modified: 11/2/20	06
11/2/2006 3:34 AM	S
8/2/2006 12:15 AM	F
	8/2/2006 12:15 AM 8/2/2006 1:03 AM Type: LOG2 File Size: 0 bytes Date modified: 11/2/20 11/2/2006 3:34 AM

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b. File restore:

Modified file will be restored immediately, excepted inaccessible file.

For inaccessible file : srcore will firstly copy the old version file to the restore folder and name it like :

system.ini	Size: 94 bytes	on Sett	1 KB 1 KB
test(11).bat	Date modified: 11/2/200 8/1/2006 11:27 PM	Windows Batch File	1 KB

Then it will register an autorun program called srdelayed.exe which will be executed when system starts up, and meanwhile log the operations which will be done by srdelayed.exe in <System volume information>\systemrestore\DelayedOperations. srdelayed.exe will overwrite the inaccessible file later with the copied file.

Show result : Finally,srcore will register an autorun entry under <RunOnce> key to execute rstrui.exe to show the restore status when user enter system next time.

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Startup :

In the startup, Windows will run srdelayed.exe to do some remaining post actions (e.g. move the copied file to overwrite the file which is inaccessible in previous restore). And then run rstrui.exe to show restore result to user.

VSR rootkit

u Purpose :

survive after the system restore

hide following items from system restore: 1. registry items

2. executables


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u Approach :

1. How this rootkit intercept the restore process:

Thru shutdown call back hooking :

Microsoft has passed the restore function name and module under WinInit as described before :




This key will be set when the system requests a restore. If rootkit dynamically modifies this key to point to its module and routine when after system sets this key, guess what will happen?

Yes, the rootkit's module will be loaded, Microsoft has no checking on the module.

2. How can it continue the system restore:

It loads srcore.dll internally ,and call ShutdownContinuation exported by srcore itself.



3. How can it make file survive?

It loads file in memory before calling ShutdownContinuation exported by srcore.dll, and restore the files from memory to disk after the calling. (because all files and registery items are restored in the calling)

4. How can it make registry item survive?

This is relatively difficult, but still easy for a rootkit author. As described before, OS will rename original hive to a new name ,and copy restored hive to the location.

However, after these operations in calling of ShutdownContinuation exported by srcore.dll, both the restored hive file and renamed hive file will be locked.

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What VSR does to solve the locking problem is to hook IAT of srcore.dll to intercept the call : RegLoadKeyW

In its hooking procedure of RegLoadKeyW, it will follow the below steps :

For registry hive it wants to hide items in: a. load the key ourselves to a temp key before calling the real RegLoadKeyW b. do recovery (write rootkit protected registry items to registry) under temp key c. unload the key d. pass the call control to real RegLoadKeyW and return

For registry hive it doesn't want to hide any item in, just simply pass the call control to real RegLoadKeyW and return.

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A new way to bypass HIPS

 Malware author might benefit from shutdown call back hook to bypass commercial HIPS

u The theory :

1. Malware initiates a restore from any restore point, and modify restore module and routine to point to malicious ones.

2. When user shuts down his computer, malicious module will be called, and malware can do anything they want (E.g. create malicious autorun key) without popup of HIPS in its module.

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u But there might be some concerns:

1. Will user notice if the shutdown takes long time to complete? (Because the restoration will happen during system shuts down)

No, because malware will not need to call original ShutdownContinuation for any restore actions. This will make the shutdown very quick.

2. How malware solves Vista's popup for restore error next time when user logs on if it doesn't call original ShutdownContinuation ?

This can be done by deletion of run key rstrui.exe under <RunOnce>

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
Protect & detect VSR

 Microsoft needs to use more secure parameter passing method (e.g. do signature verification for calling module)

 For commercial HIPS to protect VSR intrusion, they need to monitor the WinInit modification by a malware.

But the challenge is : Microsoft might still leaves some other places to implement VSR.

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For detection of the VSR, security providers can use the cross-compare technology for rootkit detection.

In order to get the real view of files & reg keys that system restore should restore, they can access the volume shadow copy to enumerate the files & reg keys in restore point.

How can they access ?

Just use Win32 API (e.g. FindFirstFile), but pass the path parameter like:

\\.\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy2\Windows\system32

(But the media is just read-only)

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