

# » Fuzzing XML Based Protocols (SAML)



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# **Agenda**

- » Introduction
  - SAML
  - OpenSAML
- » Scenarios
- » Implementation
- » Conclusion

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#### SAML

- » Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
- Codified by OASIS with participation from MACE and others
- » Defines XML Schema for AuthN and attribute assertions, queries, responses, and use profiles such as Web SSO.
- Defines bindings to protocols for transport
- » V2.0 expands SAML and includes definitions from Shibboleth and the Liberty Alliance



## SAML in a Nutshell

- » An XML-based framework for exchanging security information
  - XML-encoded security assertions
  - XML-encoded request/response protocol
  - Rules on using assertions with standard transport and messaging frameworks
- An OASIS standard (1.0, 1.1, and 2.0)
  - Vendors and users involved
  - OpenSAML implementation available
  - Codifies current system outputs vs. creating new technology



## **OpenSAML**

- » OpenSAML for the message and assertion formats, and protocol bindings which is based on Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
- » SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is a standard for the formation and exchange of authentication, attribute, and authorization data as XML. It describes various kinds of messages and standard ways of transporting them.
- » OpenSAML is a set of open-source libraries in Java and C++ which can be used to build, transport, and parse SAML messages.



# **Technology**

- » Basic concepts
  - Subject/principal
    - User or application requesting access to a resource
  - Assertion
    - Set of statements about a subject
  - Authority
    - Entity that produces and/or consumes assertions
  - Binding
    - Specification for transporting assertions as protocol payloads
  - Profile
    - Specification describing rules for embedding, transferring, extracting, and processing assertions




# **Technology**

- » Use cases
  - Web single sign-on (SSO)
    - User logs onto source site and implicitly requests brokered logon to one or more destination sites with pre-existing trust relationships to source site
  - Authorization
    - Once having logged onto trusted destinations via SSO, user requests authorized access to various resources controlled by destinations
  - Back-office transactions
    - User attaches assertions to electronic business document and transmits to relying party



## SSO use case





# **Assertion Title Syntax**

#### Assertion

- --Identifier
- --Issuer
- --Issuance timestamp
- --Conditions
- --Advice

#### Statement

**Authentication Statement** 

**Attribute Statement** 

**Authorization Decision Statement** 



# **Message Exchange Protocol**

SAML request message specifying assertion type to be returned\*

# SAML requester

within

SAML-enabled

authentication authority,

attribute authority,

PDP,

or PFP

SAML response message containing assertion of type specified\*

SAML responder

within

SAML-enabled
authentication authority,
attribute authority,
PDP,
or PEP

\*optionally, SAML messages may be digitally signed via XML Signatures, or sent over secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) channels



# **Binding with SOAP**

SOAP message

SOAP header

SOAP body

SAML message

SAML assertion



## **SAML** assertions

- » An assertion is a declaration of fact about a subject, e.g. a user
  - (according to some assertion issuer)
- SAML has three kinds, all related to security:
  - Authentication
  - Attribute
  - Authorization decision
- You can extend SAML to make your own kinds of assertions
- » Assertions can be digitally signed



## All assertions have some common information

- » Issuer and issuance timestamp
- Assertion ID
- » Subject
  - Name plus the security domain
  - Optional subject confirmation, e.g. public key
- "Conditions" under which assertion is valid
  - SAML clients must reject assertions containing unsupported conditions
  - Special kind of condition: assertion validity period
- » Additional "advice"
  - E.g., to explain how the assertion was made




## **Authentication assertion**

- An issuing authority asserts that:
  - subject S
  - was authenticated by means M
  - at time T
- Caution: Actually checking or revoking of credentials is not in scope for SAML!
  - Password exchange
  - Challenge-response
  - Etc.
- It merely lets you link back to acts of authentication that took place previously

## Foundstone<sup>\*</sup> **Professional Services** A DIVISION OF MCAFEE SSO pull scenario **Authentication Authority** Policy Decision Point + + Attribute Authority Policy Enforcement Point Source Destination Web User Web Site Web Site Authenticate (out of band) Access inter-site transfer URL Redirect with artifact Get assertion consumer URL Request referenced assertion Supply referenced assertion Provide or refuse destination resource (out of band)

# Foundstone Professional Services A DIVISION OF MCAFEE

# **Our Scenario**



SiteB.com



# Login

POST https://www.acme.com/app/loginSubmit.jspx HTTP/1.1

Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, \*/\*

Referer: https://www.acme.com/app/login.jspx

Accept-Language: en-us

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET

CLR 1.1.4322) Paros/3.2.10

Host: www.acme.com

Content-Length: 118

Connection: Keep-Alive

Cache-Control: no-cache

referer=&userName=ymchen&password=ymchen&x=16&y=9



# Login Response (Set-Cookie)

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily

Cache-Control: no-cache,no-store,max-age=0

Pragma: No-cache

Content-Type: text/html

Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT

Location: https://www.acme.com/app/welcome.jspx

Set-Cookie:

JSESSIONID=Gkfbl3YJ9MBdxzVLkRtPpXkYD6gMQkCQMCJVz3dYld

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7kPcdJG1LJ!239153226; path=/

Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2006 23:17:15 GMT

Connection: close



## Get SAML Assertion from ACME.com for SiteB

GET https://www.acme.com/app/loginToSiteB.jspx HTTP/1.1

Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, \*/\*

Cookie: CP=null\*;

JSESSIONID=Gkfbl3YJ9MBdxzVLkRtPpXkYD6gMQkCQMCJVz3dYld

7kPcdJG1LJ!239153226

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible)

CLR 1.1.4322) Paros/3.2.10

Host: www.acme.com

Connection: Keep-Alive

Accept-Language: en-us

Content-length: 0

MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET

Using ONLY
JSESSIONID to get
SAML Assertion



# Response from ACME.com

```
<form name="samlform"
    action="https://www.siteb.com/actionb.dll?cmd=sson&pid=1234
    5" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="SAMLResponse"
    id="SAMLResponse" value="Base64 Encoded SAML
    Response">
</form>
```



# **SAML** Response -- Header

<Response xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol"
 xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
 xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol"
 xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 lssueInstant="2006-06-29T23:23:20.559Z" MajorVersion="1"
 MinorVersion="1"
 Recipient="https://www.siteb.com/actionb.dll?cmd=sson&amp;
 pid=12345" ResponseID="\_c875208d11f9daa014770c0cf7812418">



# **SAML** Response -- Digital Signature

```
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SianedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-</p>
    c14n#"></ds:CanonicalizationMethod>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"></ds:SignatureMethod>
<ds:Reference URI="# c875208d11f9daa014770c0cf7812418">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"></ds:Transform>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"><ec:InclusiveNamespaces</p>
    #default xsd xsi"></ec:InclusiveNamespaces></ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"></ds:DigestMethod>
<ds:DigestValue>QNVCOOOsXzCDyl2mp6wZGhUBUCl=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>
SqT0UDeIhUk2KYPk/N6TA2STerwDOTL/4paQ39odRhbngUwzfCizJwLCvZKHCqCwSY3btv9ai/kz
1i0180VCnpMtytVR0UWWM8kzRf1AuPEB3gm5gCZkX1zp/UOnWyEkpdSRNGSguFilrMt9g7JoE7Cg
QiR1uDqdBwPsOGlmkcw=
</ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
```

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## **SAML** Response – Status

```
<Status><StatusCode Value="samlp:Success"></StatusCode></Status>
```

<Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"</pre>

AssertionID="\_b3360dd260d9c4f7215554869a12044c"

IssueInstant="2006-06-29T23:23:20.559Z"

Issuer="http://www.acme.com" MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1">



# **SAML Response -- Condition**

29T23:23:20.559Z"

AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password">

<Conditions NotBefore="2006-06-29T23:23:20.559Z"</p>

NotOnOrAfter="2006-06-29T23:28:20.559Z">>

<AudienceRestrictionCondition>

<Audience>http://www.siteb.com</Audience>

</AudienceRestrictionCondition>

</Conditions>

This SAML
Assertion is only
valid for 5
minutes!!!



# **SAML** Response -- Subject

- <Subject>
- <NameIdentifier>123456789054321</NameIdentifier>
  - <SubjectConfirmation>
  - <ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer/Confir mationMethod>
  - </SubjectConfirmation>
- </Subject>
- <SubjectLocality IPAddress="10.50.45.23">
- </SubjectLocality>
- </AuthenticationStatement>



# **SAML** Response -- Attributes



## **Posting SAML Response**

POST https://www.siteb.com/actionb.dll?cmd=sson&pid=12345 HTTP/1.1

Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, \*/\*

Referer: https://www.acme.com/app/loginToSiteB.jspx

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Host: www.siteb.com

Connection: Keep-Alive

Cache-Control: no-cache

SAMLResponse=<Base64 encoded>



## **Response from SiteB**

HTTP/1.1 200 Ok

Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0

Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2006 23:23:58 GMT

P3P: policyref="/w3c/p3p.xml", CP="CAO DSP IND COR ADM CONo CUR CUSi DEV PSA PSD DELi OUR COM NAV PHY

ONL PUR UNI"

Connection: close

Set-Cookie: RID=BLAHBLAH; path=/

Content-Type: text/html

Content-length: 12345



# **Implementation**

- » Read the XML File
- » Parse all elements and attributes
- » Put in attack patterns
- » Results and problems



## Read XML File

- » Save the base 64 decoded file as an XML file
- » Using System.XML to read the XML file like this:
  - XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(filename, settings);
  - Other ways like DOM or DataSet can be used too
- » Determine NodeType (Element or Attribute)



#### **Attack Patterns**

- » Only buffer overflow was tested.
- » Patterns like 'Z' x 1024, 'Z' x 4096 or random data pattern
- » After you generate the XML file,
  - Base 64 encode
  - Generate HTTP POST request
- » File name convention
  - <element>-<attribute>-<test>.xml
  - E.g.: ds:Signature-value-50k.xml
- » Coverages
  - 15 elements and their attributes
  - Hundreds of test cases



#### Issues

- » How do we determine results automatically?
- » By three conditions:
  - Comparing HTTP Response Code from the server
  - Comparing HTTP Response Content-Length header
  - Time out (in case the server died)
- » Looking for anomolies (like an IDS)
  - Send normal request first
  - Send test case to compare results



#### Results

- We found one buffer overflow:
  - <ds:Signature>
  - The program did not handle the signature verification correctly, therefore when you feed a large amount of data, it crashed.
- » Flawfinder found 29 potential problems on OpenSAML
  - Our test application was 'based' on OpenSAML implementation
  - We can't test what we don't see!



#### **Future Works**

- » Need to add more attack
  - XPATH Injection
  - XML memory corruption test
  - Authorization test
    - If you have another user's account, can you become that user?
- » Need to correlate with source code review results.
  - Can you 'prove'/'disprove' flawfinder's result?
- » Can similar tests been done in unit testing?
  - Even earlier, in TDD
- » We have not touched the backend process part



## Reference

- » PROTOS -- <a href="http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/">http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/</a>
- » SAML -- <a href="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc\_home.php?wg\_abbrev=security">http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc\_home.php?wg\_abbrev=security</a>
- » OPENSAML <a href="http://www.opensaml.org/">http://www.opensaml.org/</a>



## » Question & Answer



Thank You!
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