



#### MYSELF





- MyCERT, CyberSecurity Malaysia
- Lebahnet(honeynet), Botnet, Malware







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**Reversing Android Malware** 

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#### Ministry of Science, Technology & Innovation

#### INTRO: Dalvik Bytercode

- Below are list of websites for studying and understanding Dalvik's opcode.
  - Official Android SDK Documentation accessible via git
    - http://android.git.kernel.org/?p=platform/ dalvik.git;a=tree
  - http://pallergabor.uw.hu/androidblog/ dalvik\_opcodes.html
    - Based on Gabor's RE on .dex bytecode
  - http://www.netmite.com/android/mydroid/dalvik/ docs/dalvik-bytecode.html
  - http://developer.android.com/reference/ packages.html - Android SDK API





- .class public final com/xxxx/xxxx/
  - A class file
- .super java/lang/Object
  - o A super object
- .source DataHelper.java
  - o A source file
- field public static final a Ljava/lang/String
   A 'field' with "string" attribute
- .method static <clinit>()V
  - o A static method with a VOID return
- new-array vA, vB, type@CCCC
  - o Construct a new array of the indicated type and size. The type must be an array type.



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#### INTRO: Dalvik Bytercode

- const/\*(4,16) vA, #+B
  - o Move the given literal value (sign-extended to 32 bits) into the specified register
- invoke-\* (direct.static.super.interface.virtual)
  - Call the indicated method. The result (if any) may be stored with an appropriate moveresult\* variant as the immediately subsequent instruction.
- s-(get|put)-\*(wide,float,object,byte,char)
  - Perform the identified object static field operation with the identified static field, loading or storing into the value register. Note: These opcodes are reasonable candidates for static linking, altering the field argument to be a more direct offset.
- move-result-\*(wide,object)
  - Move the single-word/double/object (non-object) result of the most recent invoke-kind into the indicated register.
- new-array vA, vB, type@CCCC
  - o Construct a new array of the indicated type and size. The type must be an array type.



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#### INTRO: Dalvik Bytercode

- if-(eq,ne,gt,lt,ge,le) vA, vB, +CCCC
  - o Branch to the given destination if the given two registers' values compare as specified.
  - Note: The branch offset may not be 0. (A spin loop may be legally constructed either by branching around a backward goto or by including a nop as a target before the branch.)
- If-(eq,ne,gt,lt,ge,le) vA, +CCCC
  - Branch to the given destination if the given register's value compares with 0 as specified.
  - Note: The branch offset may not be 0. (A spin loop may be legally constructed either by branching around a backward goto or by including a nop as a target before the branch.)





#### INTRO: Dalvik Bytercode

- *move v0,v11* 
  - Move v11 to v0
- Goto 178a
  - o GOTO line 78a
- a-(get|put)-\*(wide,float,object,byte,char)
  - Perform the identified array operation at the identified index of the given array, loading or storing into the value register.
- i-(get|put)-\*(wide,float,object,byte,char)
  - Perform the identified object instance field operation with the identified field, loading or storing into the value register.
  - Note: These opcodes are reasonable candidates for static linking, altering the field argument to be a more direct offset.



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
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## ANDROID MALWARE





# CyberSecurity







#### Android Malware





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#### Android Malware

- Malicious piece of codes.
- Infection methods:
  - o Infecting legitimate apps
    - Mod app with malicious codes (Geinimi, DreamDroid.ADDR)
    - Upload to "Market" or 3rd party hosting
  - o Exploiting Android's (core/apps) bugs
  - o Fake apps
    - DreamDroid's removal tool



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## Android Malware



- o Remote install?.
  - Victim's gmail credential is required
  - Browse "Market" and pass gmail info
  - "Market" will install app into victim's phone REMOTELY









http://www.net-security.org/article.php?id=1556

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- Latest addition to android malware family
- Modus Operandi
  - o Infecting legitimate software
  - o Hosted at "Market"
  - o 53 software infected
- Bundled with exploits to "root" the Android
  - o Exploid (CVE-2009-1185)
  - Rageagaintsthecage (CVE-2010-EASY)
- Bot capability



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#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

{v3},com/android/root/Setting/stopSelf ; stopSelf()V

```
invoke-direct {v1,v3}, java/io/File/<init> ; <init>(Ljava/lang/String;)V
      invoke-virtual {v1}, java/io/File/exists ; exists()Z
      iget-object v3,v5,com/android/root/Setting$1.this$8 Lcom/android/root/Setting;
lnvoke-static {v3,v2},com/android/root/Setting/access$0; access$8(Lcom/android/root/Setting;2)V
 157 .method static access$0(Lcom/android/root/Setting; Z)V
 158 .limit registers
     ; parameter[0] : v0 (Lcom/android/root/Setting;)
     ; parameter[1] : v1 (2)
    .line 221
        invoke-direct {v0,v1},com/android/root/Setting/destroy ; destroy(2)V
163
164
     .end method
                  v0,v3,com/android/root/Setting.ctx Landroid/content/Context;
320 invoke
321 1119ea:
                   {v0,v1,v2},com/android/root/Setting/cpFile ; cpFile(Landroid/content/Context;Ljava/lang/String;Lj
    .line 230
```





#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

- Life Circle (entry point)
  - o Launch Itself via INTENT (Launcher)
    - AndroidManifest.XML
  - Checking "profile" file (Init on Setting->Init on Setting\$1)
    - If exist, stopSelf()
    - Else
      - Check if the ".downloadsmanager" is installed
      - If installed, stopSelf()
      - Else
        - start copying sqlite.db to DownloadProvidersManager.apk (cpFile())



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## RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

- Life Circle (r00ting the b0x)
  - o Check the "profile" file
    - If exist, destroy() ->stopSelf()
    - Else
      - Prepare for UdevRoot
        - Run Exploid
      - If Failed
        - Prepare for AdbRoot
        - Run "rageagaintsthecage"
      - destroy() -> cpFile() | stopSelf()







#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)



```
v5.com/android/root/udevRoot
       Lget-object v6, v12, com/android/root/Setting.ctx Landroid/content/Context;
       invoke-direct (v5,v6),com/android/root/udevRoot/<init> ; <init>(Landroid/content/Context;)V
967
    .line 272
968
      invoks-virtual {v5},com/android/root/udevRoot/go4root ; go4root()2
969
       Lf-mgs v6,111fb2
```

```
v0.com/android/root/adbRoot
                v6,v12,com/android/root/Setting.ctx Landroid/content/Context;
v7,v12,com/android/root/Setting.handler Landroid/os/Handler;
                   (v0,v6,v7),com/android/root/adbRoot/<init> ; <init>(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/os/Handler
.line 279
        (v0),com/android/root/adbRoot/go4root; go4root()2
```



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#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

```
v6.v12.com/android/root/Setting.ctx Landroid/content/Context;
            v7,v12,com/android/root/Setting.handler Landroid/os/Handler;
        lrect {v0,v6,v7},com/android/root/adbRoot/<init> ; <init>(Landroid/content/Context; Landroid/os/Handler
invoke-virtual {v0},com/android/root/adbRoot/go4root; go4root()2
       v6,111f44
```

```
329 .method public go4root()Z
    .limit registers
    ; this: v2 (Lcom/android/root/adbRoot;)
      Limcke-direct {v2},com/android/root/adbRoot/prepareRawFile ; prepareRawFile()2
```

```
.line 107
343
      Invoke-direct {v2},com/android/root/adbRoot/runExploid ; runExploid()2
```


#### adbRoot aka rageagaintsthecage







#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)







#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

- Life Circle (calling home)
  - o XOR-ed URL

```
.line 249
           v2,java/lang/String
v3,v5,com/android/root/Setting$2.val$c [B
            (v2,v3),java/lang/String/<init>; <init>([B)V
v3,v5,com/android/root/Setting$2.this$0 Lcom/android/root/Setting;
             {v3},com/android/root/Setting/access$1 ; access$1(Lcom/android/root/Setting;)Landroid/content/Con
```





#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

Life Circle (calling home)

o OnCreate()->Setting\$2.run()







#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage2 payload)

- DownloadProvidersManager.apk
  - Silently installed/copied into /system/app


```
318 coast-string v1, sqlite.db"
319 coast-string v2, DownloadProvidersManager.apk"
320 invoke-static {v0,v1,v2},com/android/root/Setting/cpFile
321 lll9ea.
230 now-instance v10,java/lang/StringBuilder
231 coast-string v11, //system/app/"
```





#### RE #3: DreamDroid (stage1 payload)

- Life Circle (calling home)
  - o XOR-ed URL







## RE #3: DreamDroid (stage2 payload)

- What it does?
  - o RE DownloadProvidersManager.apk
  - o Start via AndroidManifest.xml too:)







#### RE #3: DreamDroid (cont)

#### Features:

- Encrypted communication (XOR)
- Encrypted data
- Bot capability
- Two stage payloads
  - 1st Payload Infected app
    - Rooted device
    - Install 2<sup>nd</sup> payload (DownloadProviderManager)
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> Payload DownloadProviderManager
    - Sqllite.db (original filename)
    - Receive instructions from C&C
    - Send info to C&C
    - Silently install itself (copy to /system/app directory)



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#### RE #3: DreamDroid (cont)

- Encryption
  - XOR operation
    - KEY="6^)(9-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^&5(j.g^&o(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^O(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^O(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)(0-p35a%3#4S!4S0)\$Yt%^O(\*0)\$Yv!#O@6GpG@=+3j.&6^)
    - =1".getBytes()
    - DATA=
    - "9442938832952138511219112519102302419997621102222611139125244801090511910 011960487794252
  - o Revealed C&C server
    - http://184.105.245.17:8080/GMServer/GMServlet
- Send IMEI,IMSI, Device Model, SDK Version to C&C server



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Conclusion

**CHALLENGES AND ISSUES** 




## Challenges and Issues



- Typical Reverse engineering challenges
  - Code obfuscation
    - Obfuscation on data
  - Encryption
    - Make it harder
    - Eventually will be broken (as for current sample)
  - Code optimizing
- Tools is not yet mature
  - o IDA PRO like RE suite
  - o XREF











Intro

Android

malware

Reversing

Android

Cases Study

Issues






#### ||CyberSecurity||



#### Challenges and Issues

- Spotting the malicious apps
  - o Not RE problem but how do you spot the malicious app?.
- Remote Install via "Market" would be interesting to observe







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#### Conclusion

- Android malware is interesting topic
  - o More complex android malware are expected
  - o More exploits on Android platform are expected
  - o More powerful hardware will change the landscape!
- It is possible to reverse engineering Android malware
  - o A lot of free tools to reverse engineering android apps/malware
  - o Solving a puzzle. PERIOD

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Reversing tools are there, but yet to mature





Q&A





# **THANKS**

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