Advanced Mobile Devices Analysis Using JTAG and Chip-off

Forensics Ninja



Who am I

- Captain a.k.a Forensics Ninja
- Research since 2010
- Facebook Forensics (2011) on Hakin9 Magazine
- Mac Memory Forensics (2014) on Digital Forensics Magazine
- Investigation and Intelligence Framework (2015) on Forensics Focus
- Advanced Mobile Devices Analysis Using JTAG and Chip-Off (2016)



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Speaker@

SANS DFIR DefCON 20 • HITCON AVTokyo APWG • HTCIA • VXCON



Agenda

- Introduction to JTAG and Chip Off
 Analysis on JTAG and eMMC dump
 Demo

Training Course

- TeelTech Advanced JTAG / Chip-Off Mobile Forensics
- Cellebrite JTAG Extraction and Decoding
- H11 JTAG Data Recovery and Mobile Phone Repair
- XRY Advanced Acquisition Training
- viaforensics (NowSecure) until 2012
 Course Fee around USD4,000

Why JTAG / Chip-Off?

- Physical vs Logical vs Forensics tools
- Bricked
- Locked without debugging mode
- Damaged
- Special cases

What is JTAG?

- Joint Test Action Group
- Test Access Ports (TAPs) to collect raw data from a memory chips
- Not chip-off and ISP
- Extreme physical data acquisition
- Advanced technique
- Soldering and De-soldering



Price lists

Source from NowSecureUS dollars




Soldering iron and stand \$50 Solder and solder wick \$15 Kynar wire \$15 Magnifying light \$65 Power supply \$100 Tool Kit \$35 Multimeter tool \$40 Jumper wires \$45 PC Header \$5 **RIFF Box JTAG \$170** Medusa JTAG \$160 **Optional adapters \$80**

Total: **\$780**


JTAG Box



JTAG Finder




Mounting Frame & Arms



BGA (eg 162 or 169)


Ball Grid Array

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



TAP


• TCK – test clock • TMS – test mode state TDI – test data in TDO – test data out ● TRST – test reset NRST – normal reset • RTCK – return clock GND – ground




JTAG Pinout








JTAG Molex and Jig











Demonstration using Riff Box

HTC EVO 3GAndroid OS




Demonstation using Riff Box

Lumia 620Windows 8 OS





Acquisition of the Flash Rom



Retrieved Data from phone

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Decoding the Lock Pattern

gesture.key
20 bytes in length
open source tools



Gesture.key

					H	TC EVO	Full.bin *	*OVERWI	RITE MC)DE**	
Hex Te	xt Find A8	A2 A0 7B	64 C8 97 9	D BA 07 6	B 28 EC 3	1 58 3A (51 83 52 F	A			
	Replace										
=											Replace All Replace Replace & Find Previous Next
1819192584	616D696E 675F616C	60657765	64061502	41016C6E	62617460	65655570	72657660	64657272	FEGIGCOC	65776564	aming allowed Allocation providence allowed
	051B033B 01696E73										aming_allowed A location_providers_allowed
1819192628											; install_non_market_apps - roaming_sou nd_on = lockscreen.password_typeH
1819192072											
1819192760											Åôμαţ [*] /NgÑõØ< [°] < Stñ ≤
1819192804	03C703E6 006B03AF										$\hat{E} k \emptyset \emptyset - \hat{E} = default_instal = l$
1819192848	6F636B73 63726565										ockscreen.password_typeH 7 lock_pattern_aut
1819192892											olockG C allowed_geolocation_originsA# K ht
1819192936	635F6572 726F725F	7265706F	72745F70	720F0323	01616462	5F656E61	626C6564	321F0343	01616C6C	6F776564	c_error_report_pr # adb_enabled2 C allowed
1819192980	5F67656F 6C6F6361	74696F6E	5F6F7269	67696E73	410E0321	01616E64	726F6964	5F69642C	18033501	61737369	_geolocation_originsA ! android_id, 5 assi
1819193024	73746564 5F677073	5F656E61	626C6564	0E120329	01626163	6B75705F	656E6162	6C65641D	16033101	6261636B	sted_gps_enabled) backup_enabled 1 back
1819193068	75705F70 726F7669	73696F6E	65643514	032D0162	61636B75	705F7472	616E7370	6F72741E	10032501	626C7565	up_provisioned5 - backup_transport % blue
1819193112	746F6F74 685F6F6E	01170333	01626F74	685F6E65	74776F72	6B5F6F70	74696F6E	3A1B033B	0163646D	0 615F6365	<pre>tooth_on 3 both_network_option: ; cdma_ce</pre>
1819193156	6C6C5F62 726F6164	63617374	5F736D73	15190337	01636675	5F717565	72795F77	68656E5F	63616D70) 6F6E1C10	ll_broadcast_sms 7 cfu_query_when_campon
1819193200	03250164 6174615F	726F616D	696E6702	18033501	64617461	5F726F61	6D696E67	5F616C6C	6F776564	06160331	% data_roaming 5 data_roaming_allowed 1
1819193244	01646174 615F726F	616D696E	675F6775	6172641A	1E034101	64617461	5F726F61	6D696E67	5F677561	2645F61	data_roaming_guard A data_roaming_guard_a
1819193288	6C6C6F77 6564071E	03410164	6174615F	726F616D	696E675F	67756172	645F626C	6F636B65	64081803	35016465	llowed A data_roaming_guard_blocked 5 de
1819193332	6661756C 745F696E	7075745F	A8A2A07B	64C8979D	BA076B28	EC31583A	618352FA	00000000	00000000	00000000	fault_input_®¢†{d»óù∫ k(Ï1X:aÉR′
1819193376	00000000 00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	

What is Chip-Off?

- eMMC chip
- NAND Flash
- Disassemble & Re-balling






Heating Machine / Stand



eMMC Programmer & Adapters






eMMC Box




EPR Box & BGA 169e adaptor



Demonstration

JTAG eMMC ISP Samsung Tools



Version:V3.1
Device ReadyOK!
Read Info
Pin Check up
Pin Check upOK!
Device Ready
Device ReadyOK!
ID check
ID check: 00010015
Product name: VYL00M
User partition size: 3AB000000 (15024M / 14.671G),
15753805824 Bytes
Boot partition size: 0x200000 (2.0M)
RPMB partition size: 0x20000 (0.1M)
ID checkOK!
ID check success. time:0.80 sec.
Reading
Device Ready
Device ReadyOK!

SN:00000803119

CSD Lewcon Long Locp L


Fie 「User: C:(东海EPR_BOX v3.183\eMMC\eMMC.bin 「Boot1: C:(东海EPR_BOX v3.183\eMMC\eMMC.boot1 「Boot2: C:(东海EPR_BOX v3.183\eMMC\eMMC.boot2 「Ext_CSD C:(东海EPR_BOX v3.183\eMMC\eMMC.ext_csd RPMB: C:(东海EPR_BOX v3.183\eMMC\eMMC.rpmb Repd <u>Verify Write</u>

Value	Name	Field	Width	Cell Type	CSD-slice
0x03	CSD structure	CSD_STRUCTURE	2	B	[127:126]
0x04	System specification version	SPEC VERS	4	B	[125:122]
ī.	Reserved		2	B	[121:120]
0x27	Data read access-time 1	TAAC	8	B	[119:112]
0x01	Data read access-time 2 in CLK cycles (NSAC*100)	NSAC	8	R	[111:104]
0x32	Max, bus clock frequency	TRAN_SPEED	8	R	[103:96]
0xF5	Device command classes	CCC	12	R	[95:84]
🗖 0x09	Max. read data block length	READ_BL_LEN	4	R	[83:80]
🗖 0x00	Partial blocks for read allowed	READ_BL_PARTIAL	1	R	[79:79]
0x00	Write block misalignment	WRITE_BLK_MISALIGN	1	R	[78:78]
0x00	Read block misalignment	READ_BLK_MISALIGN	1	R	[77:77]
🗖 0x00	DSR implemented	DSR_IMP	1	R	[76:76]
	Reserved	•	2	R	[75:74]
OxFFF	Device size	C_SIZE	12	R	[73:62]
🗖 0x06	Max. read current @ VDD min	VDD_R_CURR_MIN	3	R	[61:59]
🗖 0x06	Max. read current @ VDD max	VDD_R_CURR_MAX	3	R	[58:56]
🗖 0x06	Max. write current @ VDD min	VDD_W_CURR_MIN	3	R	[55:53]
🗖 0x06	Max. write current @ VDD max	VDD_W_CURR_MAX	3	R	[52:50]
🗖 0x07	Device size multiplier	C_SIZE_MULT	3	R	[49:47]
🗖 0x1F	Erase group size	ERASE_GRP_SIZE	5	R	[46:42]
0x1F	Erase group size multiplier	ERASE_GRP_MULT	5	R	[41:37]
🗖 0x1F	Write protect group size	WP_GRP_SIZE	5	R	[36:32]
🗖 0x01	Write protect group enable	WP_GRP_ENABLE	1	R	[31:31]
0x00 🗖	Manufacturer default ECC	DEFAULT_ECC	2	R	[30:29]

Belkasoft Evidence Center

Evidence Center Ultimate
File Edit View Tools Help
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Overview ^a ×
O Add data source
What sources would you like to analyze? Select drive, image, dump, device or other source to include to the case
Available types of data sources Drive image file or virtual machine disk
C Logical drive
Physical drive
Mobile backup file, UFED image, chip-off or JTAG dump
Live RAM image file (pagefile.sys, hiberfil.sys, memory dumps)
 Selected folder C:\Program Files (x86)\Belkasoft Evidence Center Ultimate\Samples
 Analyze data source Run hashset analysis Advanced options
Next > Cancel

UFED Physical Analyzer



HITCON Training (Wish)

November 2016One Day (6 hours)

Question?

forensicsninja@gmail.com