How to hijack VolTE network

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Bio

- -10 years in telecom security,
- -co-author of GSMA FS.20 GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP) Security document
- -Head of telecom security research in **SecurityGen**
- -Focused on telecom vulnerabilities: RAN, VoLTE, VoWiFi, GTP, Diameter, 5G SA and NSA.
- -Conducting telecom security assessments for mobile operators for many years.



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Research Team

- -Pavel Novikov (SecurityGen)
- -Alex Onegov (ex-SecurityGen)
- -Sergey Mashukov (SecurityGen)





Why now?






Short course of mobile network evolution




2G voice-only






2G +Data






+3G network






+4G data






4G voice?






4G native voice






4G native voice






Voice-over-LTE = VoltE






CS-Fallback voice






CS-Fallback voice






5G NSA native voice






5G NSA native voice







5G native voice




Voice-over-New-Radio = VoNR




5G NSA fallback



5G SA fallback




-1st LTE network deployed in December 2009 (TeliaSonera, Sweden + Norway)






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
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
-full-featured VoLTE network in May 2014 (Singapore) with only phone Samsung Galaxy Note 3

-almost all new phones having VolTE support in 2020





Almost all new phones having VoLTE support ONLY in 2020... 10 years after LTE network was deployed





MNO: It seems time to deploy VolTE...



Bombshell

Verizon (USA) retire their 2G and 3G network by 31 December 2022





Bombshell


Verizon (USA) retire their 2G and 3G network by 31 December 2022

Initially they said that it will happen in the end of 2019, but they postponed, because industry was not ready, that's why many other haven't believed that in the end of 2022 they will do that.





2G/3G retire



All the networks in the world was affected

- ➤ Verizon (USA) retire their 2G and 3G network by 31 December 2022
- ➤ It means, that if subscriber of some network without VoLTE goes to the USA, he will not be able to call anymore.





All the networks in the world was affected

- ➤ Verizon (USA) retire their 2G and 3G network by 31 December 2022
- ➤ It means, that if subscriber of some network without VoLTE goes to the USA, he will not be able to call anymore.
- Money and reputation are affected





Build Volte network in 60 seconds...

➤ Operators started to build their VoLTE network very fast, many of them built it in few months.





Build Volte network in 60 seconds...


- ➤ Operators started to build their VoLTE network very fast, many of them built it in few months.
- Many configuration mistakes were made









APN – outside network




APN – outside network



IMS APN









Security by obscurity

Modern phones are hiding IMS APN from list of APNs





IMS network









So.. How to hijack VolTE network?

Break rules!



IMS APN










Better to use common tools






Subscriber isolation for internet connection






No isolation for IMS interface






Let's get access as legal subscriber







Build own fakeIMS infra?








































MiTM?






Need to push P-CSCF address to the phone







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
Decided to hack phone








Decided to hack phone






If it is not enough –
"root" may help
Or editing "mbn" config
on Qualcomm based
devices




MiTM successful?






Hijack VoltE network






Hijack VoltE network






Hijack VoltE network



Use internet for free



Profit

- 1. Internet APN charging based on used amount of data, but IMS network charging based on minutes and implemented into IMS infrastructure
- 2. As we don't use IMS infrastructure at all, data over IMS APN will not be charged
- 3. Due to lack of isolation we can establish direct subscriber-tosubscriber communication
- 4. We can set up OpenVPN tunnel to another subscriber and use his internet
- 5. Other kind of tunnels are also work, or even p2p networks
- 6. If network provides VoLTE roaming then we can implement free internet in Roaming (leaving laptop in home network)

SecurityGen

Mitigation for MNO

- 1. Turn on subscriber isolation, as it is usually done for Internet APN
- 2. Implement IMS network monitoring



Conclusion

- 1. Such misconfiguration (lack of subscriber isolation on ims APN) we see in more then 50% of tested network
- 2. Mobile operators are very big and slow, they were not interested in deploying IMS infrastructure for more then 10 years of LTE network. But now they are in hurry and deploying VoLTE network very fast and not secure.



Thank you!

Pavel Novikov <u>Pavel.Novikov@security-gen.com</u>

Security Gen

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