



Botfox - 基於瀏覽器與社交工程之殭屍網路研究
Botnet based on Browser and Social Engineering

動機

你知道嗎？

現行的安全防護不像你想像的那般健壯 ...

實驗證實，

『它』可以繞過目前所有常見的安全防護 ...

你相信嗎？

『它』的技術含量低到只有我用『它』 ...

你相信嗎？

『它』的建置成本很低很低 ...

你認同嗎？

大腦本身就是一種永遠可以被利用的 0day...

自我介紹



Powered by
自由軟體鑄造場
Open Source Software Foundry

Ant

yftzeng@gmail.com

FreeBSD 官方中文文件維護者

自由軟體授權 系統管理師

Wow!USB 隨身碟防毒 經濟學 中研院

自由軟體鑄造場

資安實習生

台灣駭客年會講師

Wow!ScanEngine 掃毒引擎

Wow!ARP 防護軟體

程式設計師

主題

歡迎來到
Web 2.0 的時代



Wiki

web
editable
por voluntarios



1º) Editar.



2º) Escribir.



3º) Guardar.

Es un ejemplo de
Web 2.0




PUNTO



Twitter is over capacity.


Too many tweets! We'll try to lighten the load and have things back to normal soon.



Plurk is a place that lets you publish and share your thoughts, emo-ness, #^@%!*%(& and loves.



See what other people are doing right now or [signup](#).



歡迎來到
Cloud 的時代



mediaeater@flickr.com
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/mediaeater/3476903211/>





jaxmac@flickr.com
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/jaxmac/193001859/>



Power · Robust · Convenience

當一切都變得不再單純 ...

混沌、複雜

Friday, April 3, 2009

TEST

S*:DEMO:yftzeng@gmail.com:Hi

Welcome to HIT 2009

Posted by Ant at [12:18 AM](#) [0 comments](#)

Labels

- [words](#) (169)
- [security](#) (53)
- [management](#) (37)
- [feeling](#) (30)
- [rethinking](#) (24)



demohit

Follow

<Email>:[text]:Email:ant
<Passwd>:
[password]:Passwd:ossf
<PersistentCookie>:
[checkbox]:PersistentCookie:yes
<signIn>:[submit]:sign in

less than a minute ago from web

Name HIT

0 following 16 followers

Updates 296

Favorites

Actions
block demohit

Following

 [RSS feed of demohit's updates](#)

歡迎來到
~~Web 2.0~~ 的時代
Bot 2.0 的時代
(aka. CloudBot)


Bot 1.0




Attacker



C&C Server





Zombies





Victims

Bot 2.0 (aka CloudBot)



Bot 1.0

Bot 2.0



Botnet 的定義

指由 Malware 操控平台所成形成的一種 Command and Control (C&C) Topology 。透過 Botnet 架構讓 Hacker 能夠大量且自動化地操控 Bot 。

來源：

Jeremy Chiu (aka Birdman)

Workshop on Understanding Botnets of Taiwan 2009
第一屆台灣區 Botnet 偵測與防治技術研討會

殭屍網路的 演化史




演化趨勢
推斷未來模式

以 Protocol 分群

Protocol


1. IRC
2. HTTP
3. P2P
4. Instant Messenger (MSN etc.)
5. Own communication

Botnet Trends Analysis



Botnet Trends Analysis

1. 高隱匿、難追蹤
2. 利用社交工程
3. 開始注意嵌入式設備
4. 以感染的數量換取其它的優勢



Router Botnet





- .* called 'psyb0t'
- .* maybe first botnet worm to target routers and DSL modems
- .* contain shellcode for many mipsel devices
- .* not targeting PCs and Servers
- .* user multiple strategies for exploitation, such as bruteforce user/pass
- .* harvests usernames and passwords through deep packet inspection
- .* can scan for exploitable phpMyAdmin and MySQL servers

回到主題



Botfox - 基於瀏覽器與社交工程之殭屍網路研究
Botnet based on Browser and Social Engineering

提出一個對於未來演化的可能
以及早對未來作出因應對策

Botfox *Research*

1. 基於瀏覽器
2. 基於社交工程
3. 基於純 JavaScript 語言
4. 基於 Web 2.0/Cloud



基於瀏覽器

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持式裝置、手機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

基於社交工程



1. 人性是資訊安全最弱的一環
2. 修補大腦比修補軟體漏洞來得難
3. 即使訓練有素，仍難敵好奇心驅使



基於純 JavaScript


1. 網頁標準語言之一
2. 跨瀏覽器的特性
3. 防毒軟體難以分析其惡意程式
4. 不需額外開啟通訊埠 (port)

基於 Web 2.0/Cloud

1. 運用 Web 2.0 的發文機制
2. 使用 Cloud 的效能與穩定性
3. 低成本開發，不需設計 Protocol 與建置 C&C
4. 基於合法網站為掩護










如釣魚般等待上餌














利用受害者的名義及社交網路散佈 (如 Email)

















因有別於其它 SPAM 方式，使得釣魚成功率提高











在合法網站上的 C&C 分散佈置 (如 Blog, Twitter, Plurk)





[SEARCH BLOG](#)[FLAG BLOG](#)[FOLLOW BLOG](#)[Next Blog»](#)yftzeng@gmail.com | [New Post](#) | [Customize](#) | [Sign Out](#)

混沌、複雜

Friday, April 3, 2009

TEST

D:ant.openfoundry.org

Posted by Ant at [12:18 AM](#)



Labels

- [words](#) (169)
- [security](#) (53)
- [management](#) (37)
- [feeling](#) (30)




混沌、複雜


對 ant.openfoundry.org 進行 DDoS 攻擊

D:ant.openfoundry.org

Posted by Ant at [12:18 AM](#)




- Labels
- [words](#) (109)
 - [security](#) (53)
 - [management](#) (37)
 - [feeling](#) (30)











Bots 不定時向 C&C 收取訊息




















DEMO

Botnet Detection



Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords

Bypass Matrix 🏠



	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Virustotal is a **service that analyzes suspicious files** and facilitates the quick detection of viruses, worms, trojans, and all kinds of malware detected by antivirus engines. [More information...](#)

File **BotFox.xpi** received on **2009.07.16 05:29:57 (UTC)**

Current status: **finished**

Result: **0/41 (0.00%)**

Antivirus	Version	Last Update	Result				
				K7AntiVirus	7.10.793	2009.07.15	-
a-squared	4.5.0.24	2009.07.16	-	Kaspersky	7.0.0.125	2009.07.16	-
AhnLab-V3	5.0.0.2	2009.07.16	-	McAfee	5677	2009.07.15	-
AntiVir	7.9.0.215	2009.07.16	-	McAfee+Artemis	5677	2009.07.15	-
Antiy-AVL	2.0.3.7	2009.07.16	-	McAfee-GW-Edition	6.8.5	2009.07.16	-
Authentium	5.1.2.4	2009.07.16	-	Microsoft	1.4803	2009.07.16	-
Avast	4.8.1335.0	2009.07.16	-	NOD32	4248	2009.07.16	-
AVG	8.5.0.387	2009.07.15	-	Norman	6.01.09	2009.07.15	-
BitDefender	7.2	2009.07.16	-	nProtect	2009.1.8.0	2009.07.16	-
CAT-QuickHeal	10.00	2009.07.16	-	Panda	10.0.0.14	2009.07.15	-
ClamAV	0.94.1	2009.07.16	-	PCTools	4.4.2.0	2009.07.15	-
Comodo	1666	2009.07.16	-	Prevx	3.0	2009.07.16	-
DrWeb	5.0.0.12182	2009.07.16	-	Rising	21.38.30.00	2009.07.16	-
eSafe	7.0.17.0	2009.07.15	-	Sophos	4.43.0	2009.07.16	-
eTrust-Vet	31.6.6617	2009.07.15	-	Sunbelt	3.2.1858.2	2009.07.15	-
F-Prot	4.4.4.56	2009.07.16	-	Symantec	1.4.4.12	2009.07.16	-
F-Secure	8.0.14470.0	2009.07.16	-	TheHacker	6.3.4.3.368	2009.07.15	-
Fortinet	3.120.0.0	2009.07.16	-	TrendMicro	8.950.0.1094	2009.07.16	-
GData	19	2009.07.16	-	VBA32	3.12.10.8	2009.07.15	-
Ikarus	T3.1.1.64.0	2009.07.16	-	ViRobot	2009.7.16.1838	2009.07.16	-
Jiangmin	11.0.706	2009.07.15	-	VirusBuster	4.6.5.0	2009.07.15	-

AntiVirus

1. JavaScript 的特性，使得在判斷上有許多困難。
2. 無任何 API Hooks 。
3. 無任何 Registry 。
4. 無任何 DLL 。

T 牌、K 牌、S 牌、A 牌、N 牌 ... 等，
全數通過 VirusTotal 的廠商。

Bypass Matrix 🏠



	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords

Rootkit Detection

1. JavaScript 的特性，使得在判斷上有許多困難。
2. 無任何 API Hooks。
3. 無任何 Registry。
4. 無任何 DLL。

RootkitRevealer、RkHunter、GMER、Panda Anti-Rootkit、Sophos Anti-Rootkit、Rootkit Hook Analyzer、IceSword、Avira Rootkit Detection、Rootkit UnHooker、AVG Anti-Rootkit、McAfee Rootkit Detective、DarkSpy、F-Secure BlackLight。

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [WOW\Administrator]

File Options View Process Find Users Help

Process	PID	CPU	Description	Company Name
System Idle Process	0	83.81		
Interrupts	n/a		Hardware Interrupts	
DPCs	n/a		Deferred Procedure Calls	
System	4	5.88		
smss.exe	532		Windows NT Session Manager	Microsoft Corporation
csrss.exe	596	2.94	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
winlogon.exe	620		Windows NT Logon Application	Microsoft Corporation
services.exe	672	0.98	Services and Controller app	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	844		Generic Host Process for Win32...	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	920		Generic Host Process for Win32...	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	1016		Generic Host Process for Win32...	Microsoft Corporation
wuauclt.exe	1852		Windows Update Automatic Up...	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	1060		Generic Host Process for Win32...	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	1112		Generic Host Process for Win32...	Microsoft Corporation
spoolsv.exe	1616		Spooler SubSystem App	Microsoft Corporation
scardsvr.exe	1684		Smart Card Resource Managem...	Microsoft Corporation
svchost.exe	1924		Generic Host Process for Win32...	Microsoft Corporation
VBoxService.exe	120		VirtualBox Guest Additions Ser...	Sun Microsystems, Inc.
alg.exe	1068		Application Layer Gateway Ser...	Microsoft Corporation
msiexec.exe	2128	0.98	WindowsR installer	Microsoft Corporation
lsass.exe	684		LSA Shell (Export Version)	Microsoft Corporation
explorer.exe	1496	0.98	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
VBoxTray.exe	1768		VirtualBox Guest Additions Tra...	Sun Microsystems, Inc.
ctfmcon.exe	1776		CTF Loader	Microsoft Corporation
procexp.exe	3748	0.98	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinterna...
firefox.exe	3396	0.98	Firefox	Mozilla Corporation

CPU Usage: 11.43% Commit Charge: 6.83% Processes: 23 Physical Usage: 71.24%

Process Explorer

1. 基於瀏覽器。
2. 不需額外的 Process。
3. 無任何 DLL。

Process Explorer、Process Monitor、Combofix、Hijackthis、SREng、EFIX、Runscanner、Autoruns。

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



TCPView - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

File Options Process View Help

Process	P...	Local Ad...	Remote Address	State
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1150	storage4-dsr.flickr.vip.gq1.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1153	jp-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1157	jp-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1145	storage3.flickr.vip.spl.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1136	ty-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1140	ty-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1151	storage4-dsr.flickr.vip.gq1.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1147	storage4-dsr.flickr.vip.gq1.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1154	jp-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1158	jp-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1146	storage3.flickr.vip.spl.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1137	ty-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1141	ty-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1148	storage4-dsr.flickr.vip.gq1.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1152	storage4-dsr.flickr.vip.gq1.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1155	jp-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1138	ty-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1149	storage4-dsr.flickr.vip.gq1.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1156	jp-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1144	storage3.flickr.vip.spl.yahoo.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1139	ty-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1166	jp-in-f104.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1172	ty-in-f118.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1174	jp-in-f104.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1179	tx-in-f101.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1180	cf-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1182	cf-in-f191.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1184	cf-in-f118.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
firefox.exe...	TCP	wow. :1187	cf-in-f118.google.com:http	ESTABLISHED
lsass.exe:6...	UDP	wow:isakmp	**	

Endpoints: 47 Established: 33 Listening: 4 Time Wait: 1 Close Wait: 0

(Untitled) - Wireshark

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Help

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No. -	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
2534	23.162344	72.14.203.191	10.0.2.15	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
2535	23.162738	72.14.203.191	10.0.2.15	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
2536	23.162904	10.0.2.15	72.14.203.191	TCP	kiosk > http [ACK] Seq=806 Ack=114371
2537	23.163103	72.14.203.191	10.0.2.15	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
2538	23.168010	72.14.203.191	10.0.2.15	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
2539	23.168010	10.0.2.15	72.14.203.191	TCP	kiosk > http [ACK] Seq=806 Ack=117267
2540	23.168010	72.14.203.191	10.0.2.15	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
2541	23.168010	72.14.203.191	10.0.2.15	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

[next sequence number: 117267 (relative sequence number)]
 Acknowledgement number: 806 (relative ack number)
 Header length: 20 bytes
 Flags: 0x18 (PSH, ACK)

0030	22 38 5f 72 00 00 73 73 3d 27 63 72 6f 73 73 63	"8_r..ss = 'crossc
0040	6f 6c 20 73 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 27 20 69 64 3d 27	ol section' id='
0050	63 72 6f 73 73 63 6f 6c 27 3e 3c 2f 64 69 76 3e	crosscol '></div>
0060	0a 3c 2f 64 69 76 3e 0a 3c 64 69 76 20 69 64 3d	.</div>. <div id=
0070	27 6d 61 69 6e 2d 77 72 61 70 70 65 72 27 3e 0a	'main-wr apper'>.
0080	3c 64 69 76 20 63 6c 61 73 73 3d 27 6d 61 69 6e	<div cla ss='main
0090	20 73 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 27 20 69 64 3d 27 6d 61	section ' id='ma
00a0	69 6e 27 3e 3c 64 69 76 20 63 6c 61 73 73 3d 27	in'><div class='
00b0	77 69 64 67 65 74 20 42 6c 6f 67 27 20 69 64 3d	widget B log' id=
00c0	27 42 6c 6f 67 31 27 3e 0a 3c 64 69 76 20 63 6c	'blog1'> .<div cl
00d0	61 73 73 3d 27 62 6c 6f 67 2d 70 6f 73 74 73 20	ass='blo g-posts
00e0	68 66 65 65 64 27 3e 0a 3c 21 2d 2d 20 67 6f 6f	hfeed'>. <!-- goo
00f0	67 6c 65 5f 61 64 5f 73 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 5f 73	gle_ads ection_s
0100	74 61 72 74 28 6e 61 6d 65 3d 64 65 66 61 75 6c	tart(nam e=default
0110	74 29 20 2d 2d 3e 0a 3c 68 32 20 63 6c 61 73 73	t) -->.< h2 class
0120	3d 27 64 61 74 65 2d 68 65 61 64 65 72 27 3e 46	= 'date-h eader'>F
0130	72 69 64 61 79 2c 20 41 70 72 69 6c 20 33 2c 20	riday, A pril 3,
0140	32 30 30 39 3c 2f 68 32 3e 0a 3c 64 69 76 20 63	2009</h2 >.<div c
0150	6c 61 73 73 3d 27 70 6f 73 74 20 68 65 6e 74 72	lass='po st hentr
0160	79 20 75 6e 63 75 73 74 6f 6d 69 7a 65 64 2d 70	y uncust omized-o

Text item 0, 1448 bytes Packets: 2762 Displayed: 2762 Marked: 0 Dropped: 0 Profile: Default

Network Monitor

1. 基於瀏覽器，不需開啟 Port 。
2. 使用 HTTP/HTTPS 。
3. 使用正常 DNS 。
4. 封包 / 字串無任何惡意內容 。

TCPView 、 WireShark 、 Nmap 。

Bypass Matrix 🏠


	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honey pots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Honeypots


1. 被動式 Honeypot → 使用社交工程手法。
2. 主動式 Honeypot → Bots 間不溝通，避免被名單搜集。
3. C&C 使用正常網站，難以區別正常、異常瀏覽。
4. 封包 / 字串無任何惡意內容。

Capture-HPC、Tinyhoneypot、Capture BAT、Google Hack Honeypot、Honeyd、Honeytrap、Honeywall、Honeyclient。




正

必須成為 Botnets 的一員



272.17.31.10



272.17.31.11



272.17.31.13



272.17.31.14



272.17.31.15




272.17.32.11



272.17.32.12




272.17.32.13



邪

Bot 彼此間不直接溝通
C&C 網站難以區別正常、異常瀏覽







Bypass Matrix 🏠


	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords





Detecting Botnets Through Log Correlation (2006)





基於瀏覽器


1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持裝置、裝置、主機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

BotFox

基於瀏覽器

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為 (基於 Port 80, 443 的實現)
2. 跨平台特性 (手持式裝置、手機等)
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

BotTracer



----- (bot startup) ----- ▷ (prepare to receive commands) ----- ▷ (attack)


BotTracer: Execution-based Bot-like Malware Detection (2008)

suspicious

highly suspicious

bot malware

BotTracer



基於瀏覽器


1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持裝置、裝置、主機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

BotFox

基於瀏覽器


1. 非常容易模擬正常行為 (基於 Port 80, 443 的實現)
2. 跨平台特性 (手持式裝置、手機等)
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

BotSniffer



BotSniffer: Detecting Botnet Command and Control Channels in Network Traffic (2008)

BotSniffer



基於瀏覽器

BotFox

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持裝置、裝置、主機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

基於瀏覽器

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為 (基於 Port 80, 443 的實現)
2. 跨平台特性 (手持式裝置、手機等)
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

Behavior/Log Analysis

1. 基於瀏覽器，非常容易模擬正常行為。
2. 瀏覽器常為白名單的一員。
3. 使用 HTTP/HTTPS，封包 / 字串無任何惡意內容。
4. 使用正常 DNS。

BotSniffer、BotTracer、Log Analyzer。

Bypass Matrix 🏠


	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Detecting DDNS Bots

Assumption:

1. For DDNS, botnets tend use subdomains; legitimate directories use subdirectories
2. Use SLD/3LD-ratios to identify botnet traffic




Botnet Detection and Response: The Network is the Infection (2005)

Detecting DDNS Bots

Assumption:

1. For DDNS, botnets tend use subdomains; legitimate directories use subdirectories
2. Use SLD/3LD-ratios to identify botnet traffic



Monitoring Group Activities

Differences between Botnet and Legitimate DNS

	Source IPs accessed to domain name	Activity and Appearance Patterns	DNS Type
Botnet DNS	(Botnet members)	Group activity appeared (Specific situation)	DDNS
Legitimate DNS	Anonymous (Legitimate users)	Non-group activity Randomly and continuously appeared (Usually)	Usually DNS

Monitoring Group Activities

Differences between Botnet and Legitimate DNS

	Source IPs accessed to domain name	Activity and Appearance Patterns	DNS Type
Botnet DNS	Fixed size Group (Botnet members)	Group activity Intermittently appeared (Specific situation)	Usually DDNS
Legitimate DNS	Anonymous (Legitimate users)	Non-group activity Randomly and continuously appeared (Usually)	Usually DNS

Anomaly Detection to DNS Traffic

Assumption: Bots typically employ DDNS

Identifying Botnets Using Anomaly Detection Techniques Applied to DNS Traffic (2008)

Methods:

1. High DDNS query rates may be expected because botmasters frequently move C&C servers.
2. looking for abnormally recurring DDNS (NXDOMAIN). Such queries may correspond to bots trying to locate C&C servers that have been taken down.

Anomaly Detection to DNS Traffic

Assumption: Bots typically employ DDNS

Methods:

1. High DDNS query rates may be expected because botmasters frequently move C&C servers.
2. looking for abnormally recurring DDNS (NXDOMAIN). Such queries may correspond to bots trying to locate C&C servers that have been taken down.

基於瀏覽器

BotFox

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持裝置、裝置、主機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

基於瀏覽器

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持式裝置、手機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

Cooperative behavior




Figure 2. Comparison of response time between humans and bots

Cooperative behavior




Figure 2. Comparison of response time between humans and bots

基於瀏覽器

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為（基於 Port 80, 443 的實現）
2. 跨平台特性（手持裝置、主機等）
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

BotFox

基於瀏覽器

1. 非常容易模擬正常行為 (基於 Port 80, 443 的實現)
2. 跨平台特性 (手持式裝置、手機等)
3. 最常使用的應用程式之一
4. 白名單的常客
5. 完全使用正常的 DNS 查詢

DNS Traffic

1. 基於瀏覽器，非常容易模擬正常行為。
 2. 使用正常 DNS 。
-


Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Spam Signatures

u_1 : http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?QjQRP_xbZf.cVQXjbY,hvX
 u_2 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?giAfS.cVQXjbY,hvX>
 u_3 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?RQbWfeVYZfWifSd.cVQXjbY,hvX>
 u_4 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?UbSjWcjHC.cVQXjbY,hvX>
 u_5 : http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?VPS_eYVNfS.cVQXjbY,hvX
 u_6 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?QNVRCjgVNSbgfSR.XRW,hvX>



Spamming Botnets: Signatures and Characteristics (2008)

Figure 5: Example input URLs and the keyword-based signature tree constructed by AutoRE.

[http://www.mezir.com/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{9,25}](http://www.mezir.com/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{9,25})
[http://www.aferol.com/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{10,27}](http://www.aferol.com/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{10,27})
[http://www.bedremf.com/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{10,19}](http://www.bedremf.com/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{10,19})
[http://www.mokver.www/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{11,23}](http://www.mokver.www/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{11,23})

$\underbrace{\hspace{15em}}$
[http://*/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{9,27}](http://*/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{9,27})

[http://arfasel.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*\[5,15\].\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://arfasel.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*[5,15].[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)
[http://apowefe.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*\[4,16\].\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://apowefe.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*[4,16].[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)
[http://carvalert.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*\[5,18\].\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://carvalert.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*[5,18].[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)

$\underbrace{\hspace{15em}}$
[http://*/hums/jasmine.html?*\[4,18\].\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://*/hums/jasmine.html?*[4,18].[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)

Figure 6: Generalization: Merging domain-specific regular expressions into domain-agnostic regular expressions.

Spam Signatures

u_1 : http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?QjQRP_xbZf.cVQXjbY,hvX
 u_2 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?giAfS.cVQXjbY,hvX>
 u_3 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?RQbWfeVYZfWifSd.cVQXjbY,hvX>
 u_4 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?UbSjWcjHC.cVQXjbY,hvX>
 u_5 : http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?VPS_eYVNfS.cVQXjbY,hvX
 u_6 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?QNVRCjgVNSbgfSR.XRW,hvX>
 u_7 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?afRZXQ.XRW,hvX>
 u_8 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?YcGGA.XRW,hvX>
 u_9 : <http://deaseda.info/ego/zoom.html?aeSfLWVYgRIBH.XRW,hvX>




Figure 5: Example input URLs and the keyword-based signature tree constructed by AutoRE.

[http://www.mezir.com/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{9,25}](http://www.mezir.com/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{9,25})
[http://www.aferol.com/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{10,27}](http://www.aferol.com/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{10,27})
[http://www.bedremf.com/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{10,19}](http://www.bedremf.com/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{10,19})
[http://www.mokver.www/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{11,23}](http://www.mokver.www/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{11,23})

$\underbrace{\hspace{15em}}$
[http://*/n/?167&\[a-zA-Z\]{9,27}](http://*/n/?167&[a-zA-Z]{9,27})

[http://arfasel.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*{5,15}.\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://arfasel.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*{5,15}.[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)
[http://apowefe.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*{4,16}.\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://apowefe.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*{4,16}.[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)
[http://carvalert.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*{5,18}.\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://carvalert.info/h/hums/jasmine.html?*{5,18}.[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)

$\underbrace{\hspace{15em}}$
[http://*/hums/jasmine.html?*{4,18}.\[a-zA-Z\]{3,7},hvX](http://*/hums/jasmine.html?*{4,18}.[a-zA-Z]{3,7},hvX)

Figure 6: Generalization: Merging domain-specific regular expressions into domain-agnostic regular expressions.

SPAM Signatures

1. 使用受害者的線上郵遞系統 → 正當來源，SPAM 特徵低。
 2. 使用多個線上郵遞系統，如 Gmail、Yahoo → 降低同源特徵。
 3. 還有很多方法可以避開 SPAM 特徵。
-

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



IRC Analysis

1. 不使用 IRC protocol 。
 2. 很多網路環境禁用 IRC protocol 。
 3. 許多安全工具視 IRC 封包為可疑 / 惡意封包 。
-

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



P2P Analysis

1. 不使用 P2P protocol 。
 2. 不需與 P2P-filter 攻防戰 。
 3. 不需額外開 Port ，降低被偵測的機率 。
 4. 可運行於僅允許 HTTP/HTTPS 的網路環境 。
-

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Open Proxy

1. 不使用 Open Proxy 。
 2. 不需額外開 Port ，降低被偵測的機率。
-

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



VPN

1. 通常 VPN 會允許 HTTP/HTTPS 。
-

Bypass Matrix 🏠

	Pass	Comments
AntiVirus	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Rootkit Detection	✅ 😱	Pure JavaScript, No API Hooks, No Registry, No DLL
Process Explorer	✅ 😱	Combine with Browser, No Process, No DLL
Network Monitor	✅ 😱	Same with normal network traffic
Honeypots	✅ 😱	Bots only connect with legitimate server (C&C), Hard to distinguish between normal and evil traffic
Behavior/Log Analysis	✅ 😱	Browser is in Whitelist (Basically), Same with normal network traffic
DNS Traffic	✅ 😱	Use legitimate DNS server, No DDNS
SPAM Signatures	✅ 😱	Use real behavior and account, and many ways to bypass SPAM detection
IRC Analysis	✅ 😱	No Implement IRC protocol. (IRC protocol often block by corporation, even some tools judge all IRC are evil connect)
P2P Analysis	✅ 😱	No implement P2P protocol. (No need to confront P2P filter, No open port, Surf with HTTP/HTTPs only environment)
Open Proxy	✅ 😱	No Open Proxy
VPN	✅ 😱	Normal allow HTTP/HTTPs
Content Filter	✅ 😱	Connect with legitimate server, Pure JavaScript, Contents is pure data not malware code, Hard to extract keywords



Content Filter

1. 封包 / 字串無任何惡意內容 → 防止關鍵字偵測。
 2. 使用正常 DNS → 防止 DNS 黑名單。
 3. JavaScript 的特性使的關鍵特徵難以擷取。
-



©Google

Google Chrome



©Opera software

Opera



©Microsoft

Microsoft IE

更甚者



©Google



©Microsoft



©Mozilla

地理定位技術 Geolocation



©Opera software



©Apple

結論

1. 歡迎來到 Bot 2.0 (aka CloudBot) 的時代。
 2. 『它』可以繞過目前所有常見的安全防護。
 3. 技術量低、成本低。
 4. 大腦本身就是一種永遠可以被利用的 0day (社交工程手法)。
 5. 雲端運算的時代，也意味著更強大、更穩健、隨開即用之跨平台惡意程式時代的來臨。
-



Ant

yftzeng@gmail.com